As pension funds look for ways to increase return, and adjust to the changing markets, the GAO is recommending more guidance as they begin to invest more in alternative investments, such as hedge funds and private equity (see Reuters article). While there is always worry of over-stepping when Congress gets involved, the trends are real and will most likely cause more concern going forward given the lower level of transparency for alternative investments. Whether future restrictions and regulations will impose a greater cost burden on such funds is yet to be seen. Of interest, data shows mid- and large-size funds to have between 21 and 27 percent investment in hedge funds, and more than 40 percent in private equity. These trends are not unlike those seen at various academic endowments (see previous post). It would not surprise me if more individuals begin exploring these investment areas as related products start to become available to retail investors.

Commodity index investors (ie, speculators) sold $39 billion worth of crude oil futures between the July market peaks and September 2nd, a time that saw a rapid sell-off in crude oil prices (see Independend.ie article). The analysis was once again done my Michael Masters, president of Masters Capital Management, who recently blamed speculators for driving up prices. The drop also comes at time when the IEA is forecasting lower demand, and pension and hedge funds are unwinding commodity positions, each of which have put pressure on prices. In the end, such debate may be academic as to whether we call those selling speculators (be it hedge funds, pension funds, index funds, or individual traders). Given the exposure we all have to pensions and index funds (even us retail money mortals), we all might be classified as speculators, notwithstanding the evil mustache-twisting monopoly banker image. Of course, all this talk says nothing as for whether speculators are even inherently bad for the markets in whole (see US News & World Report blog). After all, who is going to take the other side of the position when a company is looking to hedge its risk? If the market is rising or falling, will there always be the perfect number of textbook farmers and bakers on the other side of the wheat contract? Probably not. How many companies will show higher profits, or at least less loss, due to placing proper hedges? Raising margins to decrease leverage and unhealthy exposure is one thing, but making it more difficult for the market to even function is another. If we eliminate all trades and traders that don't actually plan to buy or sell the commodity, liquidity will decrease. If this does happen, individuals may find themselves living in a much riskier world, even if the price of crude seems a little less volatile day-to-day.

OPEC's recent decision to cut production may not have the impact that is usually expected (see NY Times article). Reports are that Saudi Arabian officials have assured world markets that they would ignore their own cartel members and continue to pump oil. While agreeing with the recent decision of OPEC to cut production, the Saudi's are concern that higher oil prices will not help the world economy, possibly causing a recession that would not only cause oil prices to collapse even further, but also speed-up the development of alternative energy sources. The 13 nations in OPEC control roughly 40-45 percent of the world's oil production (and hold roughly two-thirds of reserves), yet some large non-OPEC players in the space, such as OECD members and Russia, produce approximately 24 percent and 15 percent, respectively. The impact of the OPEC decision, especially when one of its members may be breaking ranks, may be less than might be expected, but with close to half of all production their impact is still worth paying attention to. Nonetheless, when an asset is selling-off, even on good (or at least bullish) news, then this also must be noticed. Oil is nearing the psychological $100 a barrel level once again. If this level is broken with any conviction, even in the face of possible production cuts, this would certainly be an interesting development for the entire market. Further selling pressure seems to be more of a reality at the moment, especially given the de-leveraging of commodity assets by various pension and hedge funds. Then again, as current markets have illustrated on a near daily basis, they have a tendency to change their mind pretty quickly, causing the shorts to also be quite nervous, regardless of their current bias. It is probably safe to expect continued volatility, but at this point it is not clear whether the recent decision by OPEC can reverse the recent sell-off.

Update: As a follow-up, the Times of London is also reporting that OPEC is continuing to work with Russia on oil production, scheduling another meeting for next month. Together, OPEC and Russia would produce about 50 percent of the world's oil, and could exert more influence when working together.

Update: Hurricane Ike is moving into the Gulf. A number of rigs and platforms are already being affected. Friday price action before the weekend should be interesting. Gasoline prices are jumping on the refinery impacts.

Berkshire Hathaway is apparently telling one of its subsidiaries, Kansas Bankers Surety Co., to stop insuring bank deposits above the amount guaranteed by the federal government (see WSJ article). The move will prevent banks from offering "bank deposit guaranty bonds," often used as a way to attract the business of wealthy customers. The decision stems from the fact that when banks are acquired, the company purchasing the bank may not take on the larger deposits beyond what is insured by the government, causing potential losses for those companies that have insured these extra deposits. The current move would help Berkshire reduce future losses that may occur as more banks fail or are purchased. Unfortunately, the move also signals worry by Buffett and Berkshire that more bank failures and consolidation could be expected in the future. This is certainly not the news the markets need right now.

Nothing too earth shattering here, and the Buffett interview is rushed as he on the baseball field at Boston to throw out the first pitch, but it nonetheless highlights how we all are in the same situation. When asked about the uncertainty of the markets, whether housing will recover, or whether Fannie and Freddie will be expensive to taxpayers, he basically says, "I don't know." Probably the most honest statement yet, and an illustration of how were are all just feeling around in the dark with regarding to the housing and credit crisis. There will be winners and losers in the end, as there already have been with Fannie and Freddie, but hope is still entering into the equation. Just ask Lehman.

Source: Wall Street Journal Online Video

The recent move by the Treasury to place Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship amounts to the equivalent of bankruptcy in the credit derivatives market, generating defaults, and causing dealers in unwind various credit default swaps (see Financial Times article). The move once again highlights some of the problems with the CDS market, as no one really knows the real level of exposure. The notional protection outstanding is expected to be significant, but again, the exact amount is difficult to estimate. Settlement and trading procedures, as well as general transparency, needs to be improved. While the Fannie and Freddie related CDS issues may have less concerns, given that the value of the agency debt is still high and is currently backed by the U.S. government, the next Bear Stearns-like default may not provide as clear an exit plan. The powers to be need to act fast given that the growth of the CDS market is outpacing the current trading infrastructure, while the need for hedging credit risk has never been greater.

In a effort to reduce the number of investors withdrawing money and going elsewhere, some hedge funds are cutting their fees in an attempt to retain investors (see WSJ article). Camulos Capital for one is reducing its management fees from 2 to 1.25 percent, and its fee on profits from 20 to 10 percent. Other funds are offering sliding fee scales based on time in the fund, or lower fees for agreeing to longer lock-up periods. Ironically, such a move could hurt hedge funds in more ways than just losing income. For one, it may make it more difficult to retain top talent who are often paid from fees. Second, it may make it more difficult for funds to attract new money. With higher fees often comes higher prestige, and the expectation of good talent with a track record of returns. A lower fee structure actually seems desperate to some, and may cause investors to look to other funds that appear to have a less difficult time raising capital. As fee structure are reduced, hedge funds begin to look more like mutual funds, causing fee and return expectation to change. Higher fees can actually help to differentiate the funds, delineating the expected level of risk and reward. As with human nature, we often want what we cannot have, and are even willing to pay up to get it. Of course, a few years of negative returns changes everything, even human nature.

Driven by a declining housing market, and aided by the Treasury Secretary's recent decision, hedge funds that bet against Fannie and Freddie racked up big gains on Monday (see Reuters article). Hedge fund Seabreeze Partners, run by short-seller Doug Kass, was short both companies. Kass's big bet has helped his fund to be up over 25% this year. William Ackman's Pershing Square Capital Management has also made money betting against Fannie and Freddie. Short-sellers have often been vilified, but now they have reason to gloat, causing one hedge fund manager to state: "I don't know how they could get it so wrong. There were so many red flags. I feel sorry for them." One trader that was not as fortunate was Legg Mason manager, Bill Miller, who had increased his holding in Freddie to 79.8 million shares, causing his fund to be off 31 percent for the year. Miller had previously beaten the S&P 500 for 15 years. Some speculate that the Freddie Mac losses may put pressure on Miller to step aside. The old saying, "So what have you done for me lately" never seemed so brutal.

Year-to-date, volatility hedge funds rose 7.3 percent according to data from the Newedge Volatility Trading Index (see Bloomberg article). The average equity fund fell 8.38 percent during the same time. Corporate fixed-income funds declined 4.00 percent YTD, and energy and basic- materials stock funds are down 6.36 percent over the same time frame. The 50 or so hedge funds that investing in volatility have been able to profit from the swings caused by the subprime and Fannie/Freddie news without trying to pick a direction for the market. New funds focusing on volatility are continuing to be developed nearly everyday (see previous post). This year the S&P 500 has fluctuated by more than 1 percent on 71 trading days, making this the most volatile start since 2003 and surpassing the 61 day annual average since 1928. The index is on pace to have its most volatile year since 2002, a time when there were 125 swings of more than 1 percent. The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) also reached a five year high of 32.24 on March 17 of this year (the day after the Bear Stearns bailout), and has been 33 percent higher than in 2007, averaging 23.12 this year. Some analysts are expecting elevated volatility for the next couple of years. Nonetheless, even if volatility remains above historic levels, it is worth noting that the VIX has fallen 31 percent from its five-year high in March. As such, it appears that even trading volatility can be a volatile (and risky) move.

In yet another example of the credit crisis migrating down the food chain, lenders are now giving out smaller and more expensive lines of credit to retailers than they were just last year (see Financial Week article). Not surprisingly, retailers are securing less asset-based loans, which traditionally used real estate, inventory, and other assets as collateral. By the end of August of this year, major retailers had received 16 loans valued at $4.6 billion, compared to 40 loans worth about $8.8 billion during the first eight months of 2007. Why the falloff? For one, less retailers have been taken private, thereby lowering the number of retailers and firms that are seeking out asset-based loans for leveraged buyouts. The rates charged have also increased, going from 125 bps over Libor to 225 bps over Libor on the low end. Finally, advanced rates, or the percentage of collateral that is advanced to the borrower, have been cut. Previously, advanced rate were between 95-100 percent. The rates are now closer to 85 percent as real estate and inventory values have declined.

Of interest is that the rise in borrowing costs and lower advanced rates have changed the types of companies that are seeking out and getting loans. Stronger companies that previously may have taken advantage of lower rates and the tax advantages of borrowing are shying away from asset-based loans. Now, on average, the companies that appear to be taking out such loans are those that are often being forced to secure financing, and may themselves be in a less stable situation. Given recent weak retail sales data, not to mention lower consumer borrowing (and subsequently lower consumer spending - see Bloomberg article), the number of companies (especially the speciality retailers) that need to agree to less friendly loan terms may be on the rise. Credit terms, and even the need to secure financing itself, may be one more indicator that traders and investors can use to identify those companies that are most likely to weather the current credit storm.

As of now, the Fannie and Freddie story is pretty well known, and has been looked at from a number of different angles (see various articles and posts here, here, here, and here). Now we find out that the auto industry is set to press Congress for $50 billion in low-interest auto loans (see CNN Money article). The government loans are expected to be used to help modernize plants and help the car companies make more fuel efficient vehicles. Congress had already authorized $25 billion in loans last year, but apparently that is now not enough. It is believed that the loans would have rates between 4-5 percent. Even though market rates are fairly low already, the credit ratings of both Ford and GM have fallen below investment grade, making it difficult to borrow anywhere near 5 percent.

This of course makes one wonder at which point all of this stops. Sure, it is important to keep Fannie and Freddie and the general housing mess from bringing down the financial markets, but at what cost? Starbucks has fallen on hard times. Should they get some type of bailout or support? What about Sears Holdings, with the struggling Sears and K-Mart retailers? Is it time for the airlines to go back to the well? The argument of course is usually attached to the financial sector, talking about things like contagion, or national interest, for industries such as defense and manufacturing. But where is the consistency? Just as loans are being requested to help build hybrids, electric cars, and other alternatives, other measures to increase low cost electricity or reduce our energy independence are met with resistance. Even more unsettling is that by choosing to bailout Fannie and Freddie, we (the taxpayers) are now all investors in the mortgage markets, whether we choose so or not. To add insult to injury, we can even lose more than our initial investment.

Of course the real issue of concern may not be whether or not a specific industry or company is receiving low interest loans or a nice government contract, or whether we are being forced to invest in risky companies against our will, but whether the trend of privatizing profits and socializing risk is really good for free markets. As readers know, I often discuss the need for risk management, but unfortunately for many companies their idea of risk management is simply letting the government take the reins when things go bad. Again, the point is not specifically about the current problems or plan proposed by Secretary Paulson. It appears that he had no other choice, and as he stated on CNBC: "played the hand he was dealt." Yet, should it have gotten to this point?

As is now obvious, banks kept making loans without worry of whether homeowners would pay them back. They could simply sell the loans off to Fannie and Freddie, sponsored in part by the government. While Fannie and Freddie were indeed "just" sponsored entities, there was always a "wink-wink" understanding that the government would step up in times of need. As such, both risk and return were adjusted accordingly. Yet, this was part of the problem. By having in place what amounted to a zero deductible insurance policy, Fannie and Freddie could go off and look for ways to juice returns by creating portfolios that really had no purpose other than to help meet quarterly numbers and make Wall Street and shareholders happy - all the while knowing that if things got bad, Uncle Sam was there to save the day. Well, that day has come, and now the government is left with few options, tax payers are left with more risks and unwanted investments, and the free-markets are a little less free. Where does it stop?

Ospraie Management has apparently told investors that its investment in XTO Energy contributed to its losses over the last few months (see Bloomberg article). While this is not surprising given that energy stocks have been down and have contributed to losses in numerous hedge funds, the XTO position of $128 million in shares was the largest position for the Ospraie fund, and does once again highlight the problems with having a fund be too concentrated in just a few positions. Such a concentration can cause the types of losses Ospraie incurred, including a 26.7 percent loss in just one month (see previous article and previous post).

Fund manager Dwight Anderson was quoted as once saying that: "The fact that I had a horrible quarter is a statistical probability, and we had always told people there is that possibility.'' Yes, and when you are overweight a volatile stock in a volatile industry, you can expect that statistics will line up less and less on your side. In fact, this is a common problem in a portfolio when a certain position does well. Before long a hot stock can become a major portfolio position, and one that may now be larger than your portfolio guidelines allow. Nonetheless, even though you are now overweight the position beyond allowable levels, and even though VaR measures are screaming at you, it is hard to scale back the a security that is outperforming and in a sector that is on a roll. That is until of course everything changes, and the industry or sector corrects dramatically, as we have seen with energy stocks.

Sure, these are unusual moves, but they are also precisely the types of moves you should be trying to protect yourself against. Anderson went on to say in an interview last year that: "We do everything that we can to manage the risk, and I think we're better at it today than we were a year ago.'' Apparently, everything was not enough, and everything did not include consistently updating VaR measures, or simple looking at portfolio weights. Scaling back risk is a difficult, but necessary part of any fund management, even if it involves giving up a little return in order to play another day.

As reported in a recent Asian Investor article, CQS has launched the CQS Global Volatility Fund. The fund is beginning with AUM of $160 million and has a strategy that tries to profit on equity volatility valuation anomalies within market indices and on market dislocations, including the volatility of individual global equities. Not surprisingly, the fund will rely on options and futures to take positions in the volatility-driven valuation anomalies. CQS had previously launched an Asian convertible arbitrage hedge fund in 2007 that focused on convertible bond and equity strategies in Asia, also with a global volatility bias. Whether this is yet another sign that volatility has peaked, as is often the case when new funds chase the next new thing, is yet to be seen.

Lehman Brothers (LEH) is considering shifting approximately $32 billion of commercial mortgages and real estate to a new company, nicknamed Spinco, using a good-bank, bad-bank model of the 1980s (see a recent SeekingAlpha article on the good bank, bad bank debate). Lehman would fund the bank with $8 billion of equity coming from Lehman (Korea Development Bank is in discussions to purchase 25 percent of Lehman for $6 billion), with the remaining $24 billion borrowed from Lehman or outside investors (see Bloomberg article). The Spinco option would allow Lehman to off-load 80 percent of its commercial mortgages, establishing a company capitalized and managed by outside investors. One benefit of spinning off the mortgages to its own shareholders is that Lehman can allow existing shareholders to benefit from any recovery in asset prices, thereby eliminating the need to sell at fire sale prices. If the plan fails, Lehman may be forced to seek out private equity funds and sell parts of the company, such as their asset management business Neuberger Berman (see previous post here and here).

While Lehman brothers certainly seems to be getting hit from every direction (see comments on Opsraie's problems here, of which Lehman has a 25 percent stake), they are certainly trying to be creative in how they pull the company out of potential failure. While taking the Merrill Lynch route of selling assets for 22 cents on the dollar (and financing much of the sale themselves) may have not even been a possibility for Lehman, current actions do indicate the they seem to think the worst is behind them, at least as far as the credit crisis is concerned. Maybe they have no other alternatives. Liquidity and confidence issues remain, but if they can get the needed capital, and keep from selling the entire company and its assets on the cheap, Lehman may in fact come out stronger, or at least be able to survive. Of course, this really depends first on staying afloat and not becoming the next Bear Stearns. Fortunately for Lehman, so far they have appeared to have a little less panic from their nervous investors (not much), a few more options available to them, and a little more time than a weekend to get something done. But as they say, paraphrasing, "act now - while 'capital' supplies last."

A new proposed SEC plan will overhaul oil and gas reporting rules that have existed since the 1970. The new rules will boost the proven reserves reported by oil companies, and in the process boost their shares and potentially increase interest in takeovers (see Financial Week article). The plans will essentially allow companies to book reserves from “unconventional” oil and gas sources, including oil sands and coal-bed methane. Some deep-water projects that to date have not been allowed to be described as “proven” will also now be included. Furthermore, firms will be able to publish data on what are called “probable” and “possible” reserves, where recovery is not as certain. The new rules obviously don't change the amount of oil and gas that is available worldwide, but they will help investors better calculate future cash flows and thereby place a proper valuation on a company. Needless to say, the oil companies are in favor of the new rules.

The plan will affect both U.S. and international companies that report under SEC rules, which often includes most of the larger international firms. Those with the largest non-traditional sources of future production are most likely to benefit. Analysts expect that Royal Dutch Shell is likely to benefit the most among the oil majors given that they are investing capital to retrieve crude from bitumen-soaked soil in Canada, as well as extract natural gas in coal beds in Australia and China, both of which can now be included as reported proven reserves. ConocoPhillips (COP), Exxon (XOM), and BP (BP) have also invested in non-conventional sources of oil. The reporting of non-traditional proven reserves could also have an impact on acquisitions and takeovers. As mentioned by Neil McMahon, analyst from Bernstein:

“We believe that these rule changes could be the catalyst for a wave of acquisitions, with those companies with the largest unproved resource bases making juicy takeover targets for some of the larger cash-rich majors.”

McMahon feels that Marathon Oil (MRO), with investments in oil sands and shale, and British gas producer BG, with its stakes in the deep-water Brazilian fields and a new 25% stake in Chesapeake Energy (CHK) and the Fayetteville shale, are potential targets. In fact, given that the changes will make the SEC rules more in line with European rules, the impact on UK-listed firms, among others, is expected to be positive.

The rule changes are likely to apply to 2009, and not 2008 year-end reporting since the SEC is still in a consultation period and has not committed to a time line for implementation. Given that the market is forward looking, share prices may nonetheless begin to see the impact of the proposed changes which are expected to be approved and put into place quickly.

The Harvard Management Company, in charge of the mighty Harvard Endowment, appears to be generating a return between 7-9% for fiscal 2008, according to sources familiar with the fund (see WSJ article). As a comparison, the S&P 500 fell about 15% during the same time frame. Performance has been good enough and long enough that other management companies are trying to mimic their returns (see previous post). One key to their performance is diversification. Harvard invests in 11 non-cash asset classes. In fact, when you look at the asset allocations, it is different from some traditional allocation benchmarks. From the WSJ:

"U.S. equities constitute 12% of the portfolio; developed foreign equities are 12% and emerging market equities are 10%. Total foreign equities account for 22% of the portfolio, up from 19% in 2007, compared with 12% domestic. Real assets, including commodities, are 33%, up from 31%. Fixed income dropped to 9% from 13%."

Can the average investor duplicate the returns of the Harvard endowment? The author of the WSJ article, James B. Steward, believes so - to some degree. Individual investors can duplicate most categories with individual stocks, sector mutual funds, and ETFs. Foreign equities and real assets are also able to be purchased, and are currently cheaper than just a few months ago, as are energy and commodity stocks and funds. The most difficult areas to duplicate are private equity and hedge fund returns. New long-short ETFs, and various hedge fund replication strategies are being considered, but making such investments is not currently as easy as in the other asset classes. Private equity is particularly troublesome. Nonetheless, and as mentioned by the author, given the current returns of private equity and hedge funds in general, lower weighting in these assets class may not be such a bad thing in the short-term - even if they did juice past returns. Maybe new products will become available before everyone jumps back on the alternative investment train.

Ospraie Management is closing its largest hedge fund after it has been down 38.6 percent this year as a result of bad bets on commodity stocks (see Bloomberg article, CNBC article). The fund got hammered in August, falling 26.7 percent after a sell-off in energy, mining, and commodity stocks. The closing leaves Ospraie Management with three funds that manage more than $4 billion of assets. Amazing, the $4 billion figure is down from $9 billion in March. Talk about the dog-days of summer. Lehman Brothers, with its own problems (see posts here and here) bought a 20 percent take in Ospraie Management in 2005 - yet another unfortunate turn-of-events for Lehman. Of interest is the quote from Dwight Anderson, manager of Ospraie Management:

"The fact that I had a horrible quarter is a statistical probability, and we had always told people there is that possibility. We do everything that we can to manage the risk, and I think we're better at it today than we were a year ago.''

In fact, they managed risk so good that they lost over half their assets in less than six months and are closing their flagship fund. Some times you just have to tell it like it is. People are forgiving, even when you lose lots of money. Just ask Brian Hunter.

The Financial Times is reporting how individual retail investment in U.S. equities has fallen to record lows (see article). This recent data highlights not only the nervousness of retail investors, but also illustrates the growing importance of institutional investors. By the end of 2006, retail investors owned 34 percent of all shares and 24 percent of the stock of the top 1,000 companies. These record low numbers are in contrast to when retail investors owned 94 percent of all stocks in 1950 and 63 percent in 1980. As comparison, institutions owned 76 percent of the shares in the biggest 1,000 companies in 2006, up from 61 percent in 2000.

Of course, one way to have the overall level of retail invest be down is for the large and rich retail investors to bail out of the market. A recent HSBC report (see Yahoo article) finds that the world's wealthiest people are moving their money out of stocks and bonds and into cash. As mentioned by Peter Braunwalder, chief executive of HSBC Private Bank:

"The first half of 2008 has seen a notable change in client expectations and investment choices. Faced with inflation worries, volatile asset prices and sudden changes in exchange rates, a majority of investors have reduced their transaction volumes in equities, bonds, and structured products."

Apparently, such movement into cash is greatest for clients from Asia, where their tolerance for derivatives and structure vehicles has decreased significantly as counterparty risks and volatility has increased. Given recent moves by the Fed and other central banks to increase liquidity in the wake of the credit crisis, some worry how this liquidity will eventually be removed from the market, and worry that interest rates will rise as a result.

Apparently, even large sovereign wealth funds may also be having second thoughts, or are at least re-evaluating how they deploy their ever increasing capital. An article from Asian Investor discusses how sovereign wealth funds, with their own mixed investment results allocating capital to struggling financial institutions, may now be looking for broad diversification, which will ultimately increase the amount of passive investments they make.

None of this really seems to be good news for the banks or the exchanges. As evidence of further weakening, derivative trades on the exchanges fell 13% in the second quarter (see Bloomberg article). This weakening comes as more exchanges enter the fray, causing the London Stock Exchange to cut fees as it deals with new competitors (see Financial Times article). The IPO market has also suffered recently (see Wall Street Journal article, Financial Times article). Only 25 companies priced their stock IPOs somewhere in the world in August, the lowest number of deals since Dealogic began tracking them in 1995.

Maybe even more troublesome than the reduced number of IPOs is the increased numbers of delistings that are also putting pressure on the exchanges. Year-to-date more companies have been delisted from the Nasdaq Stock Market than a year ago (see Financial Week article). To a lesser extent, NYSE listing are also up as companies fail to meet minimum listing requirements. So far, more Nasdaq-listed companies have been delisted for non-compliance this year than in the previous two years. As of August 7, 54 stocks were delisted. As comparison, only 48 total companies were delisted last year, with 52 delistings in 2006. For the NYSE, 11 companies were delisted as of July 1 of this year. This compares to 21 last year and 14 in 2006.

Along with a lower number of IPOs, the lower number of listings are affecting the profitability of the exchanges which derive up to 15% of their overall revenue from listing fees. While there have been more delistings on the Nasdaq, in part since smaller companies are more vulnerable during difficult times, companies pay much less to be on the Nasdaq (around $27,500 a year), so the loss of listing fees is not as severe. On the other hand, the NYSE will lose around $878,000 in annual revenue from IndyBank and Bear Stearns alone. When looking at the stock performance, the NYSE Euronext (NYX) stock has suffered over the last year and is right around its 52 week low near $40 per share. The CME Group (CME) has bounced slightly from 52 week lows near $300 a share to move near $340 a share, but is still struggling. On the other hand, the Nasdaq OMX Group (NDAQ) has recover to $32 a share after bottoming out around $24 a share in early July. The exchanges certainly have more issues to worry about than just delistings, and their stocks reflect this, but the continued fallout of the credit crisis is certainly continuing to find its way into more areas than the obvious players.

The news with Lehman Brothers just keeps coming. In a yesterday's post I highlighted some recent articles that discussed the value of Lehman Brothers Headquarters (article), potential private equity investment and/or purchase of Neuberger Berman (article), and plans for Lehman to cut 1,500 jobs (article). Now it appear that even as plans for reducing the work force are being put into place, Lehman Brothers is looking to hire at various B-schools (see DealBreaker article). While the move is not unprecedented (companies often hire cheap college grads to replace expensive long-timers), the timing and focus are interesting. Not only does news of the job ads come less than a week after the news of lay-offs (granted, it may have been in the works for a long-time), but Lehman is apparently looking for an "Investment Banking Full Time Associate." Of interest in the job description is the following:

"The division provides comprehensive financial advisory and capital raising services. This includes advice relating to mergers and acquisitions, privatizations, and debt and equity financings and restructuring."

No doubt that capital raising and private equity experience would certainly be useful at Lehman right now. Then again, a potential drawback is that "the program begins with four weeks of training in New York." The company could look very different in one month. As mentioned in the DealBreaker article, new hires better "act now, before they go under." Yes, I know. This is too easy to make fun of, and real people are losing real jobs. Nonetheless, given Lehman's recent moves, in particular its desire to have both a quick and sensible sale of their mortgage-related assets, at some point reality will need to step in. To see just how silly things have gotten, check out a recent Here In The City News article regarding a funny spoof email making the rounds on Wall Street. Who ever thought Lehman Brothers, the Tooth Fairy, and Tinkerbell would be in the same article. As with most good humor, there is often a little bit of truth hidden in the satire.

Of course, all of this has the contrarian in me wanting to poke around a little in the stock. I mean, how much worse can it get? Bear Stearns II cannot happen again, can it? Recent valuations certainly seem to be pricing the possibility. The moves have also been extreme enough that the technicals don't provide much help. Some support exists around $13.50, and even near the current price around $16, but both are weak. Downward trend line resistance is near $20. Investors could wait until this trend is broken, but one would have to give up four points and over 25 percent while waiting for confirmation. Traders, acting a little quicker could capture the moves, but as we saw with Bear Stearns, even nimble traders sometimes don't have enough time to act. In the mean time I will probably just sit on the sidelines and enjoy the show. There are just too many other stocks with better risk-reward ratios for investing and trading, even if they are not quite as entertaining.

It is never a good sign when your company is in financial trouble to find out that reporters, analysts, and private equity investors are suddenly interested in the value of the building that houses your headquarters. As reported in a Here Is The City News article, apparently this is exactly what some at the Financial Times and elsewhere are doing. The Lehman Brothers Times Square headquarters building is estimated to be worth $1.3 billion, or about twice what Lehman paid for the building in 2001. When you add its worth to that of asset manager Neuberger Berman, which may be valued anywhere from $6.5 to $13 billion, the sum of the two could dwarf the current market cap of Lehman, currently around $9 billion. This of course opens up the possibility of value for investors, or more likely, private equity investment (see a recent Bloomberg article on the private equity companies interested in Neuberger Berman).

This week it was also reported in a MarketWatch article and elsewhere that Lehman is planning to cut 1,500 jobs, and is also developing plans to off-load some of its real-estate loans (see the WSJ article). The company has $40 billion in commercial real estate assets and another $24.9 billion in residential assets. Lehman is desperately looking for ways to unload the mortgage-related assets for more than the 22 cents on the dollar that Merrill Lynch received (which was even worse when you considering the financing deal Merrill offered Long Star). The sale of these toxic assets may eventually make it easier to value Lehman Brothers, moving them from a "bad bank" to a "good bank" (see an interesting article by Roger Ehrenberg on the importance of separating such assets). By getting the hard to value assets off the balance sheet, Lehman should go a long way towards allowing investors to see the real value in the company, and in the process hopefully reverse the trend of their decreasing market cap. Unfortunately, it may take a fire sale of their good assets to keep them afloat long enough to see it happen. Another reason why a quick and sensible sale of their mortgage-related assets is so critical.