As the current administration continues to scold hedge fund "speculators" and blame them for potentially forcing Chrysler into bankruptcy for not accepting a deep discount on their debt (before they finally relented), those same firms may now hold more keys to the success of some of the programs being pushed by the same folks doing the scolding (see Bloomberg article). While smaller in numbers and size than just one year ago, hedge funds are still in many instances those with the most capital and risk tolerance to participate in programs such as the TALF and PPIP. Yet, while hedge funds like making money, they hate losing it even more, especially when those losses are driven in part by the rules of the game being changed. Given the recent move to ignore and subordinate more senior debt to a status lower than other parties, hedge funds may be more cautious with future investments opportunities.

Such program participation may soon get another test as hedge funds weight their options as GM goes through its own restructuring. Holders of GM bonds have just a few weeks to decide if they want to swap their debt for a 10 percent equity stake in the company - while the government and the United Auto Workers union-run health care funds get 50 and 39 percent, respectively. While not only getting the short end of the stick, those debt holders who also hold CDS contracts would most likely favor a bankruptcy filing (see Financial Times article). Estimates have investors holding $34 billion in CDS on GM, with profits on the order of $2.4 billion if GM were to default. In what is not much of a surprise, current CDS prices are indicating that a bankruptcy filing is likely. The complicated and extensive lines of debt and derivatives will make both a GM bankruptcy, and any strong arm tactics, much more difficult to execute. Given less of an incentive to participate in the next restructuring, hedge funds may find others offering a little more cooperation, and maybe even a seat at the table going forward. At some point, you cannot keep slapping the hand that may save you.

There is an interesting article by Andrew Ross Sorkin over at the Dealbook blog (see article here), discussing how the FDIC is justifying its participation in the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). In effect, the FDIC is insuring the PPIP in the name of mitigating systemic risk. While the FDIC is not suppose to guarantee obligations of more than $30 billion, for the PPIP it is not considering total obligations, but contingent liabilities, or what it expects to lose - which conveniently, they project to be nothing. This form of logic essentially allows them to lend an unlimited amount of money. Yet under the PPIP plan, the public-private pool will be financed at a ratio of 6-to-1 public-to-private money, with half of the "1" coming from the private buyer, and the other half coming from the Treasury. With this debt being non-recourse and guaranteed by the government, the risk to the government (i.e., tax payers) would be significant and fully felt. In some ways, it appears that the program will either work wonderfully, or end horribly. Maybe I am missing something, but this sounds like as risky a leveraged bet as I have ever heard. Regrettably, this appears to be just another example of solving a problem caused by taking on too much debt and risk by, you guessed it, taking on too much debt and risk. Why does the term "double down" come to mind? I don't know about you, but I am hoping we hit 21. Otherwise, it may be a long bus ride home.