While companies seem to spend a lot of time and money on finding the proper valuation for the company being acquired during mergers and acquisitions, boards can increase their chances of getting the deal done and approved by focusing on one simply, and very public benchmark. Researchers at Harvard finds that the 52-week high of the stock price of the company being acquired seems to be what matters most when valuing a company during M&A negotiations (see WSJ article). As it turns out, regardless of data from other valuation measures and techniques, many boards will insist that any purchase price is at, or above the 52-week high. To make their case, researchers at Harvard looked at 7,500 deals from 1984 to 2007 and found that psychology and irrationality helped to drive price, and that the company's 52-week high stock price seems to be the starting point for valuation negotiations. In fact, approximately three-fourths of the deals studied were priced above the 52-week high (it should be more random), with those deals also having about the same three-fourths chance of getting shareholder approval. The findings may help to explain why many deals in hindsight seem to not work out for the acquiring company - who appear to be over-paying and/or buying at the high. For traders, the time honored tradition of selling on the news seems justified once in the trade, with the 52-week high helping to provide a reference point when considering risk and return before taking a position. For companies and boards, the most rational thing, as written by the WSJ, it to "use the market's irrationality to its advantage," and not let the opportunity pass. Just ask Yahoo!'s board.

Per a recent SEC filing, and as reported in a WSJ article, the Harvard University Endowment appears to have cuts its holdings of public stock by about two-thirds. This is two-thirds of a position that has already been lowered over the years as a result of an increased exposure to alternative investments. About 70 stocks and publicly traded funds were recently valued at less than $600 million within a fund that was valued in total at nearly $37 billion last June - before losing a reported 30 percent of its value. While it appears that Harvard may have sold some of these assets near the bottom, they may have had little choice given that a significant portion of their portfolio is either managed by external managers and/or is illiquid, such as timber, real estate, and private equity investments (which in some cases could have additional funding obligations) - see a previous post that discusses potential liquidity risk issues at Harvard.

Recently it was reported that the Harvard Endowment had fallen at least 22 percent and was on its way to possibly a 30 percent loss once alternative investments are considered (see previous blog post). Now, the WSJ is reporting that the Yale Endowment has fallen 25 percent since the end of June when the endowment was valued at $10.1 billion (see WSJ article). Of interest is how marketable securities in the endowment "only" fell 13 percent, giving Yale a problem similar to Harvard - decreasing alternative investments, such as real estate and private equity, have caused the overall losses to be more severe than expected. As with Harvard, the diversification and increased use of alternative investments has helped Yale weather the downturn in the equities markets, but at the cost of decreased liquidity. The subsequent fall of less traded real estate and private equity markets has introduced a form of liquidity risk that was either unexpected, uncovered, deemed unimportant, or some combination of the three.

Fortunately, such endowments do not have the same problems with redemption requests that hedge funds experience, and can therefore possibly hold assets longer, waiting for more liquid markets. On the other hand, the academic endowments do rely on their investments for funding scholarships and supporting the general operating budget, among other things. At Yale, the endowment supports 44 percent of the $2.7 billion annual budget, or nearly $1.2 billion per year. With a decline of twice this amount in the endowment, belts at Yale will definitely needed to be tightened given that a guaranteed 16 percent return on the remaining approximately $7.5 billion would be needed in order to pay current expenses and still keep the principal in place. Of course, this just got more difficult now that the market is on its back, not to mention that the only sure bet in town - Bernie Madoff and his "guaranteed return" hedge fund - are out of business. Difficult times indeed.

The Swiss funds-of-funds firm Gottex Fund Management is launching a new fund that will emulate the investments and strategies of some of the larger U.S. academic endowment funds, such as those at Harvard and Princeton (see the HedgeFund.net article). The new Gottex fund will also allocate around 65% of the fund to alternative investments. Why 65%? When preparing the fund, the Gottex group found that a 65% exposure to alternative investments, when combined with traditional investments, did the best over the long-term. No indication if that means risk-adjusted or not. As for the alternative investments, everything from hedge funds, private equity, long-only equity, commodities, fixed income, real estate, and other real assets will be utilized. Given the current environment, the timing could prove advantageous. As mentioned by fund manager William Landes, "For the short-term the challenging environment for alternative products like private equity and hedge funds was where the opportunities lie. If I put my investor hat on, I would say that if I have a six to nine-month tactical horizon, global equity markets and some alternative markets are actually where I want to be.” Given the move by many academic endowments towards greater exposure to real assets, commodities, private equity, and international equities, any new fund emulating the likes of the Harvard fund may offer no other choice.