As pointed out in a recent Financial Times opinion piece by Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Mark Spitznagel (see FT article, concepts also expressed in a recent CNBC interview), the core economic problem that we are facing "is that our economic system is laden with debt." In fact, as pointed out by the authors, the debt load is about triple the amount relative to the GDP levels of the 1980s. Given that Tabel and his colleague have been betting on debt-induced hyperflation becoming the next black swan event (see previous post), and making them even more coin in the process, it might be easy to dismiss this as someone simply talking their book - which is probably somewhat the case. Yet the levels of the deficit spending and debt are unprecedented, and scary. Of course, what is possibly even more shocking is how making these levels know and pointing out their consequences is still looked at as a revelation, or at least finally drawing serious concern. It is simply no longer enough to point out the irony of using debt to solve a problem caused by too much debt. That train has already left the station. The focus is finally shifting to those trying to slow down the train before we all get run over.

As pointed out in the FT article, Taleb and Spitznagel believe the only solution to the debt problem is to immediately convert debt to equity. After all, companies in bankruptcy do this all the time - then again, I am not sure what that says about a country and its credit rating [Note: As a follow-up, see the recent Felix Salmon Reuters blog post about the unsustainability of debt-to-equity conversion]. To bolster their case, the authors given three reasons for their concern and reasoning. First, debt and leverage cause the system to become fragile - i.e., there is less room for error. Second, globalization has caused the system to be more complex, which in turn has caused business parameters to be more volatile. Third, and somewhat novel in perspective, is that debt is "highly treacherous." Loans hide volatility since they do not really vary outside of default. Such risk is hidden even more in highly complex derivative products, such as swaps and CDOs.

So what additional steps can governments do to reverse the trends? Tabel and Spitznagel list two options: deflate debt or inflate assets (once again, the authors are betting on the later). What have governments done? Deficit-based stimulus spending. And they are considering more (see previous post). Besides adding more debt, stimulus spending is likely to over- or undershoot since it is difficult to get just right in size and timing. This of course leaves economies vulnerable to inflation, and in some cases creates hyperinflation. Therefore, unless the levels of consumer and government debt are dealt with, and we consider other approaches for dealing with current problems, we are likely to experience another black swan - even one that is large and can be seen flying right towards us.

The following graph from the Congressional Budget Office shows the projected output gap between actual and potential GDP with and without stimulus spending, i.e., the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (see full CBO presentation). The CBO presentation highlights the implementation lags of fiscal policy, and illustrates why a stimulus package that stretches over 2 or 3 years seemed justified given that the CBO expected the GDP output gap to persist for longer than one year. Projections have only 24% of the money being disbursed in fiscal year 2009, 74% disbursed by the end of FY 2010, and 91% disbursed by the end of FY 2011.

Source: Congressional Budget Office

Given the back-loading of spending, and the realization that the recovery is not taking hold as quickly as most would want (except possibly by politicians up for re-election next year and looking for an election year boost), this is creating a problem now for both the administration and Congress. On the one hand, quicker, and more front-loaded stimulus seems warranted, yet data such as that provided by the CBO has been used to justify the huge delayed spending in coming years. Therefore, if the projections are correct, then patience is in order, but something tells me that is not going to fly as unemployment nears 10 percent.

So how do you speed things up? As outlined by the CBO, you could waive environmental reviews, award contracts without competitive bidding, or simply not dole out money by jurisdictions, but instead give money to those who can most efficiently spend it (shovel-ready project). The first one is a non-starter given the environmental shift of the current administration, the second is going to be difficult given the criticism that no-bid projects received in the last administration, and the last one is simply unacceptable to anyone in Congress - given their parochialism and the fact that it actually makes some sense (and of course, you need shovel-ready projects on a rather large scale - most are probably already funded).

So on the short-term, what needs to be done? The quickest way is through changes to taxes. This could come in rebates (which are relatively quick in non-tax months, but also somewhat ineffective when people are scared and the savings rate is increasing), or through lowering withholding (currently tried with the middle class, but not having the desired effect). This leaves suspending some income taxes for a period of time, or lowering income taxes on everyone, including the wealthy and corporations. Suspension is difficult to sell given the state, or perceived state, of social security and medicare needs, not to mention the growing deficit (even though lower rates can bring in higher receipts), while reducing taxes on corporations and the wealthy is anathema to most of those currently in power.

The limited real and political choices available has now caused the discussion to come full circle - backed to considering another stimulus. I forget - what was that definition about doing the same thing again and expecting different results? If President Obama is not able to convince the American public and Congress to be patient, we may find out the answer rather quickly.

In Barrons recent cover story (see Barrons article), roundtable members were once again interviewed about their thoughts on the economy, the markets, and select stocks. While there was varying opinion about the short-term outlook, many believe that the market has gotten ahead of itself, with some expressing longer-term concerns - even if the a short-term rally continues. As a hedge against the recent government spending spree and potential coming hyperinflation, some have stressed their continued interest in gold (one analysts with a $850/ounce entry point). The short-term stimulus / long-term worry perspective was articulated by Felix Zulauf, stating that:

"The U.S. economy will look a little better in the next two to three quarters, due to inventory restocking and fiscal stimulus. But the improvement won't continue after mid-2010, when the economy turns bumpy again."

Zulauf goes on to state that:

"The market undershot into March, and will probably overshoot in the first half of next year. The first rally is just about done. The market might climb into July, but it will correct in the fall, with stocks retracing maybe 50% of the recent advance. That will provide an opportunity to buy for a rally next spring or summer. That's the whole mini-bull market. Economic conditions won't support more than that."

Fred Hickey goes on to mention that while there are similarities to the 1930s, the current situation is different in that by adding liquidity, we may be recreating the very problem we were trying to solve. As mentioned by Hickey:

"The situation is reminiscent of the past 14 years, when the Fed primed the pump and created bubbles everywhere."

In a different Barrons article (see second article), Michael Darda, chief economist at MKM Partners, is more optimistic short and long-term, and expects the market to bottom this summer. As evidence, Darda points to the money base, measuring currency-in-circulation, bank reserves, and vault cash (see second Barrons article). The money base is now near a record high of around 2.9 times the stock market's value, a value that is slightly below a higher value in February (right before stocks took off), but below the average of 1.5 over the last 20 years. As Darda points out, the value was below 0.9 times as the stock market peaked in 2007. And while rising yields on the 10-year Treasuries have reduced refinancing, and threaten to lower home prices, Darda points out that what is important is the spread of the yield curve. The current slope is signaling strength, and not giving an inverted slope recession prediction.

But Darda does concede that while futures are pricing in a 50 bps increase in short-term rates by the end of the year, he expects unemployment levels and politics will keep the Fed from raising rates - in what could be a choice of risking a "repeat of the 1970s than a repeat of 1937-1938." This perspective of short-term moves followed by long-term concerns is in line with Arthur Laffer's recent higher inflation / higher interest rates op-ed piece in the WSJ (see previous post). In the article, Laffer highlighted that in:

"shorter time frames, the expansion of money the expansion of money can also result in higher stock prices, a weaker currency, and increases in commodity prices such as oil and gold."

Of course, over the long-term, such effects are much more negative, not only for the economy, but the market as well. Therefore, while good economist seem to vary somewhat on the short-term outlook of the economy and market (not unexpected), most agree that the longer-term consequences of the 2008 credit crisis and subsequent spending will provide a challenging environment at best going forward, especially long-term. As mentioned before (see previous post), plan accordingly.